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lated industry would profit economically at
Europe's cost. Furthermore, it would harm
the poorest countries, because if industry
just migrates the eﬀect on the climate is not
restricted.
Furthermore they doubt the popular
idea of fairness, which states that global re-
sources should be divided equally among the
world's inhabitants. Why should, for in-
stance, the United States agree to lose much
more than everyone else? That is not how in-
ternational bargaining works. Furthermore,
the per capita approach would not be good
in the long run, because states with a high
population would be rewarded. This could
lead to fertility policies that try to maximise
the size of the population. In the end their
argument remains the same: International
Paretanism is the only thing which is feasible
because every state thinks it is better oﬀ with
a treaty, and therefore is willing to negotiate. 
The chapter on future generations and
the defence of discounting is more  -
complicated than the others, and lacks some
of their coherence. Posner and Weisbach use
numerous calculations and complicate an
issue which – for their purpose – could be
explained more easily. Between these calcu-
lations they make a point that is clear and
well argued. They come to the conclusion
that the discounting of today's costs and
 future benefits at the market rate of return is
34
the best way to evaluate a climate treaty. Low
rates of return would mean that we lose
today as much as others will lose in the
 future. They make clear that this does not
mean that it is unethical, because discount -
ing is just a way to choose projects; it is not
a way to discount the value of future lives.
Although a total equal weighting of
people today and in the future is not possi-
ble, discounting to find eﬀective projects is
probably the best way to come near to it.
The scholar Dieter Birnbacher sees discoun-
ting also as a problem if the harms and
 benefits of the contemporary era are
 discounted for the future but not if
 monetary resources are. For example, it
would be unethical to say that future  suﬀer -
ing is not as important as the suﬀering today,
but it is not unethical to say that a billion
dollars will be less valuable in hundred years
than today.
Posner and Weisbach sketch the argu-
ments for the optimal design of a treaty in
the last chapter and the development of the
argument brings clarity to the whole subject.
The omnipresent issue of climate change can
be seen in a diﬀerent perspective after
 reading this provocative book, and in the
end it is clear that their ideas on a climate
change treaty are not at all unethical.  Posner
and Weisbach are separating a climate treaty
from other important issues and do not
make idealistic proposals. Justice is not left
out of it, but it does not help anyone if
 justice is the reason why an eﬀective treaty is
not possible. For the authors it is important
that something happens because former
 negotiations and agreements have failed
 dramatically. The self-interest of states
 cannot be ignored in the creation of an
 eﬀective treaty, so everyone must think that
they are better oﬀ with a treaty. The book's
ideas should be taken into account during
future international negotiations.  
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach (2010):
Climate Change Justice. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 220 pages. ISBN: 978-0-
691-13775-9. Price $27.95.
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anna Thompson’s extensive work enters
the literature at a significant juncture in
intergenerational terms. Notably, the
process of ageing in many European coun-
tries is causing the sustainability of pension
systems to be called into question, and many
political commentators are beginning to con-
template whether many of them will – or
have already – become “gerontocracies”
 (hegemony of the old). These changes have
begun, in both academia and beyond, to
 generate a debate about whether the so- called
“generational contract”, an implicit compact
which governs the relationship between old
and young, is still tenable in modern times.
Given this increasing uncertainty about how
the generations should relate to each other,
Thompson’s wide-ranging contemporary
 account of intergenerational rights and
 responsibilities could prove to be an impor-
tant reference text for today’s world.
The book is intended for both academics
and students with previous experience in the
field of intergenerational justice, but can also
be read with relative ease by readers with little
prior knowledge of the subject. This is made
possible by Thompson’s ability to articulate
the complex ideas she espouses in cogent,
comprehensible prose. In a nutshell, it is a
multi-disciplinary study on the nature of in-
tergenerational justice between past, present
and future generations which draws on, and
has implications for, environmental studies,
legal studies, political science and philosophy.
The content of the book is  pre -
dominantly devoted to Thompson’s main
aim: to propound a theory of intergeneratio-
nal  justice capable of generating rights and
 responsibilities – a moral compass for ge nera-
tional relations. For those with a keen  interest
in the theoretical dimension of intergenera-
tional studies, Thompson’s theory will be of
great interest due to its uniqueness; Thomp-
son diverges from conventional contract,
which broadly focuses on agreements  rational
citizens would make with each other, often in
a “state of nature” (e.g. Hobbes). In the in-
tergenerational justice literature, this method
of reasoning has been adopted by many
 authors, sometimes leading to an expansion
of the contractors to include not only the
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 current generation, but all generations. A
 popular route is to extend John Rawls’ “veil of
ignorance” thought experiment; in doing so,
a generational contract is reached which
would presumably be accepted by all
 generations.
Thompson rejects this conventional
 approach to intergenerational theory con-
struction on the basis of an ontological speci-
ficity which fundamentally diﬀerentiates a
contractual agreement made between
 currently living citizens and one made  be -
tween succeeding generations: unborn future
generations cannot be said to have agreed to
any contract, because they do not exist. We
cannot know what objects, institutions and
practices they will value, and the problem be-
comes increasingly problematic with regard
to distant future generations, whose value
 system may develop to such an extent that it
only vaguely resembles our own. Finding an
alternative starting point, Thompson propo-
ses that a theory of intergenerational justice
should begin by recognising that all indivi-
duals have lifetime-transcending interests
(embodied in intergenerational projects)
which ought to be respected by political
 society, thus leading to the recognition of in-
tergenerational rights and responsibilities.
This forms the central thesis of the book.
Lifetime-transcending interests are, ac-
cording to Thompson, central to the lives of
most citizens: scholars write books which they
hope will make a contribution to their re-
spective field, often for the benefit of both
present and future people; grandparents often
save to ensure that their grandchildren will re-
ceive a generous inheritance, or contribute to
their education for the sake of their future ca-
reer; and people frequently make requests
about what should be done with their body
after death. As can be ascertained from the
examples, lifetime-transcending interests are
defined as interests focusing on circumstan-
ces which could occur after one’s own life-
time. 
For the attentive reader, a question will
undoubtedly emerge with regard to the tena-
bility of Thompson’s thesis: is the supposition
that citizens have life-transcending interests
that extend beyond their lifetime not negated
by the fact that many citizens are, prima facie,
indiﬀerent towards the future? In other
words, does Thompson have a response to the
vulgar egoist who claims that that which oc-
curs after his life has ended is unimportant?
Some readers will surely conclude that life-
time-transcending interests are simply not
considered important enough by a large
enough fraction of the population to consti-
tute a basis for generating rights and respon-
sibilities which should be recognised and
protected by political society. In modern con-
sumer society, this view has enough of a basis
to threaten the very foundation of Thomp-
son’s intergenerational theory.
Thompson, in response to the sceptics,
neatly circumvents the indiﬀerence of the
egoist towards future generations. She con-
vincingly argues that many of the activities
which egoists engage in are, in fact, depen-
dent on the maintenance of intergenerational
relationships. Thompson confronts the  reader
with the case of the miser who openly con-
fesses to having no concern for future
 generations and, on the face of it, hoards gold
for the sake of his own self-interest. Thomp-
son utilises the well-known sociological
 premise of not understanding a social actor’s
interests according to his/her own self-defini-
tions, but instead identifying the sociological
underpinnings of the actor’s actions. In this
way, she demonstrates that the miser’s
 pleasure in amassing a fortune is dependent
on the social meaning of gold as a mark of
value, and that this meaning is maintained
 intergenerationally. Given the centrality of
lifetime-transcending interests to the  proposed
thesis, and the fact that the indiﬀerence of the
egoist (if widespread) poses a fundamental
challenge to a theory based on these interests,
it is surprising that Thompson devotes so
little space to her explanation to this
 challenge. An expanded explanation with
more examples would have strengthened
Thompson’s claim that  un acknowledged in-
tergenerational interests exist, and, in turn,
strengthened the basis for her theory.
In contrast to the initial theory building
phase (chapters one to four), the rest of the
book devotes itself to making a contribution
to some of the most prominent contempo-
rary debates amongst scholars of intergenera-
tional justice: what constitutes a fair share of
burdens and benefits between generations;
the role of inheritance in intergenerational co-
operation; justice between both cotemporal
and distant generations; and the non-identity
paradox problem. As well as making valuable
contributions to the above-mentioned tradi-
tional debates in intergenerational studies,
Thompson also provides the reader with a
commentary on less often discussed topics,
such as the implications of genetic engineer -
ing for intergenerational justice.
In the final chapter, Thompson
 problematises her theory by considering its
relation to the subject matter of international
relations: a world of nation-states. Thompson
suggests that two intergenerational principles
should operate in international relations. The
first is that each polity should respect the
 entitlement of members of other polities to
pursue and maintain intergenerational
 relation ships: if a polity economically exploits
or damages the environmental resources of
another  polity to the extent that inter -
generational relation ships which maintain
things people value – such as a system of
 inheritance or an ecological site of great cul-
tural or economic importance – cannot be
 sustained within it, then this constitutes an
intergenerational injustice. The second
 principle asserts that polities that have com-
mitted an injustice with regard to the first
principle should seek to put things right by
striving to ensure that the initial injustice does
not prevent intergenerational relationships
being reformed. In terms of implications,
Thompson suggests that the  application of
these principles to international relations
would lead to redistribution between rich and
poor countries. In fact, since Thompson be-
lieves that an agent, including a collective
agent such as a nation-state, can be held
 morally accountable for unwitting harms and
to some extent responsible for acts committed
by predecessors representing that agent, it
holds that Thompson’s theory may have far-
reaching moral implications for  historical in-
justices and, if accepted and acted upon, the
present international order.
In order to make the step from theory to
political reality, Thompson suggests that the
lifetime-transcending interests of citizens
need to be further researched and explicated,
and, after the content of these interests has
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been determined, they should be made more
visible in the democratic arena. Thompson’s
argument suggests that a more long-term
 oriented democratic process could be
 achieved not just through the use of an “Om-
budsman for Future Generations”, or a  lower -
ing of the voting age in order to incorporate
the views of the young generation at the
 ballot box, but through a reconsideration of
what we currently regard as rational interests
of present people. In other words, Thompson
concludes by calling for a re- examination of
the real interests, namely the interge ner -
ational interests, of present  generations.
Thompson oﬀers an innovative approach
to considering the rights and responsibilities
of citizens towards posterity and directly con-
fronts potential critique of her theory in a
convincing and logically persuasive manner,
although more space could have been  devoted
to its defence. Whilst certainly  providing an
original contribution to the debate, it remains
to be seen whether Thompson’s theory is able
to challenge the dominance of the contrac -
tarian school in intergenerational studies.
Janna Thompson (2009): Intergenerational
 Justice. Rights and Responsibilities in an
 Intergenerational Polity. New York: Routledge.
191 pages. ISBN: 0415996287. Price £80.75.
ieter Birnbacher is professor of
philosophy at the University of
Düsseldorf and a member of the
Foundation for the Rights of Future Gener-
ations’ scientific board. In 1988 he pub-
lished the book Verantwortung für zukünftige
Generationen (responsibilities for future gen-
erations), which was translated into French
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1994)
and Polish (Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa
1999). Hanna Schudy is an ethicist and en-
vironmentalist interested in questions of in-
tergenerational responsibility concerning the
natural environment. She is a doctoral stu-
dent at the University of Wroclaw and a
DAAD scholarship holder. The interview
was conducted in December 2011 at the
Heinrich Heine Universität, Düsseldorf. It
is part of Ms. Schudy’s current research into
“The principle of responsibility in Hans
Jonas’ and Dieter Birnbacher’s environmen-
tal ethics”.
Hanna Schudy: Within the framework of
the ethics that is developed by you, it is em-
phasised that moral norms must be under-
stood and accepted in general; that is why,
according to you, not every concept of value
can fulfil the requirements of universal
ethics. You stress that the axiology which
supports such an ethics should understand
value as a result of an evaluation by the sub-
ject. According to this axiology, the value of
the environment is equivalent to the inter-
ests of the evaluating subject(s). But, prob-
lematically from an intergenerational
perspective, most people, especially in
Poland, are not interested in protecting
primeval forests such as the Białowieża.1
When one accepts your axiology, the logical
corollary appears to be that, morally speak-
ing, the area is worthy of no special protec-
tion. Is this an acceptable conclusion?
Furthermore, what kind of moral norm with
regard to human attitudes towards other
similar cases can be recommended within
the framework of your ethics? 
Professor Birnbacher: Ethics should be
universally applied, and moral norms should
be formulated in such a way that they can
be universally accepted and understood.
This implies that our axiology, or our the-
ory of value, has to be rather narrow and
somewhat elementary. Therefore we cannot
expect that the values we consider to be of
importance will be shared by all subjects. In
fact, in connection with the environment,
there is a varied spectrum of different atti-
tudes. On the one hand, many subjects hold
anthropocentric attitudes towards the envi-
ronment. On the other, there are many sub-
jects who ascribe an intrinsic value to nature
as a whole, or to certain nature systems,
plants, animals, etc. In short, there exists a
variety of values. How do we manage this
variety? My proposal is that we try to make
our axiology as universalisable as possible.
This seems to me the correct route to a kind
of utilitarian ethics that respects the variety
of existing attitudes and evaluations and, in
turn, ascribes value to the satisfaction of
these values, or, in other words, to a certain
interpretation of utility. This route is not
contrary to the protection of the environ-
ment since the interests of not only the pres-
ent generation, but also future generations
must be taken into account. These interests
are crucial in our preservation efforts be-
cause we do not preserve landscapes and
other natural items solely for those living
now, but also for the indefinite future, and
all this rests upon the irreversibility of much
of the destruction of nature. In the process,
we may not only lose this plant or that for-
est as an entity, but a specific facet of nature
that is unique, such as the irreversible ex-
tinction of an animal species; it should make
us reflect on whether this has compatibility
with our intergenerational responsibilities.
This responsibility is not indifferent to what
we think our future will be, and the best
guess concerning our future is that people
will be better off than they are today; not
only will civilisation continue, but it will
spread and expand. Additionally, the degree
of material wellbeing of humans will, at
minimum, continue to grow, and it is also
probable that human needs and wants will at
some point become more concerned with
non-material goods. Among them, natural
goods will become increasingly important;
they will become scarcer, and more wanted
and desired in the future as the level of well-
being increases. 
Technical and scientific progress as well
as the so-called internal logic of capital will,
by yielding a constant surplus, ensure that
D
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